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GOLF AND TORTS:
AN INTERESTING TWOSOME
JoHN J. KIRCHER*
I. INTRODUCIION
When I was approached about writing this article, its concept took
me a bit by surprise. As someone who became an avid golfer as a teen-
ager and shortly thereafter developed a life-long interest in the law of
Torts, thinking of the two as linked was, I must admit, very odd indeed. I
view golf as a pleasurable pastime. It is an activity carried out in a "pas-
toral setting."' It is something that I concentrate upon only when I am
not involved in teaching, research, and writing about Torts. Torts, on the
other hand, are about trauma, harm - the invasion of the interests of
others. One deals with Torts in classrooms, offices, and courtrooms -
hardly pastoral settings. I cannot even recall ever drafting a Torts exam
question involving one golfer harming another. That may now change!
Of course, upon reflection it became obvious that there can be a
coming together of the two. After all, golfers swing their clubs at speeds
approaching 100 miles per hour in order to propel hard balls considera-
ble distances at speeds almost half again as fast.2 Anyone who has ever
watched a professional golf tournament knows that even the best golfers
cannot always control the direction of their shots.' Any golfer's inability
to always control shot direction and distance places people and property
in peril of being struck by a ball. Furthermore, all but a few golfers play
the game on courses that are owned and operated by others. There they
are exposed not only to errant shots of other golfers, but also to any
dangerous conditions or equipment located on the course. Finally, the
balls, clubs, and other equipment used by golfers are products that may
be defectively made or designed, and thus potential product liability is-
sues exist.
In this article I will explore golf and Torts from the standpoint of
three possible Tort defendants: 1) the golfer; 2) the golf course owner or
* Professor of Law, Marquette University.
1. Nussbaum v. Lacopo, 265 N.E.2d 762, 765 (N.Y. 1970).
2. E-mail from John Spitzer, Assistant Technical Director, United States Golf Associa-
tion, to John J. Kircher, Professor of Law, Marquette University (July 5, 2001) (on file with
author).
3. This point was brought vividly home to me while I worked as a volunteer marshal at
the 2001 Greater Milwaukee Open.
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operator; and 3) the golf equipment seller. My purpose will be to deter-
mine whether the meeting of golf and Torts results in any situations that
are unique as respects the way the rules of Tort law are otherwise
applied.
II. THE GOLFER
As previously noted, golf is a game in which clubs, ranging in weight
from eleven to fourteen ounces, are used to strike and propel a ball, less
than two inches in diameter and weighing a bit over an ounce and a
half,4 toward a target - the "hole." My research has revealed no author-
ity for the proposition that the game of golf is an "abnormally dangerous
activity" as to which the rules of strict liability would apply.5 Thus, if the
law of Torts is to be applied to the activity of golfing, one would expect
that consideration should be given to another theory.
Negligence, with its famed quartet of duty, breach, cause, and harm,
would appear the most logical theory to be applied to those engaged in
the game of golf. Taking a forceful swing at a small, hard golf ball with a
metal club in order to cause the ball to travel a substantial distance at
great speeds portends a risk of harm to those persons or things in the
path of the ball.6 However, interestingly enough, a number of courts
have disdained negligence as the proper standard to be applied to golf-
ers. For example, in Thompson v. McNeill' the plaintiff was injured
when a member of her foursome, who was at a right angle to the plaintiff
and some twelve to fifteen yards away, mis-hit a shot. The plaintiff and
her husband brought a negligence action against the other golfer.8 The
trial court dismissed the action based on earlier Ohio precedent, which
had determined that the state does not recognize a cause of action in
negligence for one injured in a sporting activity by a co-participant.9 On
appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. The court thought it was im-
portant "to fashion a special rule for tort liability between participants in
4. According to the author's digital postal scale measurement of his clubs and the ball he
customarily uses.
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-520 (1977). The only abnormal danger is
usually to the psyche of the golfer!
6. It is interesting that in baseball, players like Barry Bonds, Mark McGuire, or Sammy
Sosa are dubbed "sluggers" because they regularly hit homeruns of over 300 feet (100 yds.).
Yet a rank amateur can regularly hit a golf ball over 600 feet (200 yds.) without even coming
close to the shots of a top professional like Tiger Woods, whose longest shots are often in
excess of 900 feet (300 yds.).
7. 559 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio 1990).
8. Id. at 706.
9. Id. at 707 (citing Hanson v. Kynast, 526 N.E.2d 327, 329 (Ohio 1987)).
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a sporting event because playing fields, golf courses, and boxing rings are
places in which behavior that would give rise to tort liability under ordi-
nary circumstances is accepted and indeed encouraged."'" Obviously
then, such a rule would not apply to non-participants.
Explaining its rationale, the Thompson court said that "[t]he diffi-
culty in applying. . . principles of negligence to sports is that risk of
inadvertent harm is often built into the sport."" Continuing further with
its analysis of risks that are expected and those that are not, the court
stated:
Acts that would give rise to tort liability for negligence on a city
street or in a backyard are not negligent in the context of a game
where such an act is foreseeable and within the rules. For in-
stance, a golfer who hits practice balls in his backyard and inad-
vertently hits a neighbor who is gardening or mowing the lawn
next door must be held to a different standard than a golfer
whose drive hits another golfer on a golf course. A principal dif-
ference is the golfer's duty to the one he hit. The neighbor, unlike
the other golfer or spectator on the course, has not agreed to par-
ticipate or watch and cannot be expected to foresee or accept the
attendant risk of injury. Conversely, the spectator or participant
must accept from a participant conduct associated with that sport.
Thus a player who injures another player in the course of a sport-
ing event by conduct that is a foreseeable, customary part of the
sport cannot be held liable for negligence because no duty is
owed to protect the victim from that conduct. Were we to find
such a duty between co-participants in a sport, we might well sti-
fle the rewards of athletic competition. 2
It concluded that while there could be no actionable negligence between
participants in a sport, liability could arise from acts involving inten-
tional torts or reckless misconduct. 3 Courts in other jurisdictions have
taken a similar approach.' 4 The New Jersey court found that many legal
10. Thompson, 559 N.E.2d at 707.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Dilger v. Moyles, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591 (Cal. App. 1997); Hoke v. Cullinan, 914 S.W.2d
335 (Ky. 1995) (tennis accident, but blanket application of rule); Gray v. Giroux, 730 N.E.2d
338 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000); Schick v. Ferolito, 767 A.2d 962 (N.J. 2001); Hathaway v. Tascosa
Country Club, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. App. 1993); Monk v. Phillips, 983 S.W.2d 323 (Tex.
App. 1999). The positions taken by courts in other jurisdictions as to other sports indicate that
a similar approach would be taken if golf was at issue. Jaworski v. Kiernan, 696 A.2d 332
(Conn. 1997) (recreational soccer); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 787 (La. Ct. App.
1990) (softball game); Ritchie-Gamester v. City of Berkley, 597 N.W.2d 517 (Mich. 1999) (ice
2001]
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commentators support the view that the position it and others have
taken should be applied to all sports. 5 It stated:
The policies of promotion of vigorous participation in recrea-
tional sports and the avoidance of a flood of litigation over sports
accidents are furthered by the application of the heightened stan-
dard of care to all recreational sports. We perceive no persuasive
reason to apply an artificial distinction between "contact" and
"noncontact" sports. In fact, only a minority of courts do so. We
find that distinction contrary to the common sense notion that
risk of injury is a "common and inherent aspect" of athletic effort
generally. The risk arises in myriad forms and for many reasons.
It may arise from the physical nature of the athletic endeavor cre-
ating the possibility, or likelihood, of direct physical contact with
another player or with a ball thrown or hit among players. 6
It takes no great imagination to envision how one could commit the
intentional tort of battery by deliberately striking another person with a
golf club or ball.' 7 In fact, I venture to say that, from time to time, many
golfers have been tempted to commit such an intentional tort because of
the conduct of a playing partner or others encountered on a golf course.
As to recklessness, which lies in the gray area between intentional torts
and negligence, the Restatement provides:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of an-
other if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is
his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of
facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that
his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to an-
other, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that
which is necessary to make his conduct negligent."'
Thus, according to Prosser and Keeton, recklessness involves "disregard
of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly proba-
skating); Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1982) (en bane) (softball game); Dotzler v.
Tuttle, 449 N.W.2d 774 (Neb. 1990) ("pick-up" basketball game).
15. Schick, 767 A.2d at 967-68 (citing Brendon D. Miller, Hoke v. Cullinan: Recklessness
as the Standard for Recreational Sports Injuries, 23 N. Ky. L. REv., 409, 434 (1996); Mel Narol,
Sports Participation with Limited Litigation: The Emerging Reckless Disregard Standard, 1 SE-
TON HALL J. SPORT L. 29 (1991); Frank J. DeAngelis, Note, Duty of Care Applicable to Par-
ticipants in Informal Recreational Sports is to Avoid the Infliction of Injury Caused by Reckless
or Intentional Conduct, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 509 (1995); Melissa Cohen, Note, Co-
Participants in Recreational Activities Owe Each Other a Duty Not To Act Recklessly, 10 SETON
HALL J. SPORT. L. 187 (2000); Karen M. Vieira, Comment, "Fore!" May Be Just Par For the
Course, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 181 (1994).
16. Schick, 767 A.2d at 968 (citations omitted).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1965).
18. Id. § 500.
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ble that harm would follow, and which is thus usually accompanied by
conscious indifference to the consequences."' 9 A good example, for
those familiar with the movie "Caddyshack," comes from the scene in
which the character "Judge Smails" became so enraged about missing a
putt that he violently threw his putter away, only to have it strike a wo-
man sitting on the clubhouse patio eating lunch.20 However, caution in
categorization should be exercised. As noted by the court in Thompson
"[w]e cannot provide a single list of actions that will give rise to tort
liability for recklessness or intentional misconduct in every sport. The
issue can be resolved in each case only by recourse to the rules and cus-
toms of the game and the facts of the incident."'2 1
Despite the foregoing authority limiting the duty of golfers to each
other, some jurisdictions apparently are comfortable with application of
simple negligence rules to those who engage in the game of golf. In
Cavin v. Kasser,22 for example, the plaintiff was waiting to tee off and
was struck by a ball hit by the defendant who was playing on an adjoin-
ing hole. The plaintiff heard the defendant shout the warning "fore," but
moved too late to avoid being struck. The defendant testified that he did
not shout the warning until determining that the ball was not taking the
path that he intended. In affirming summary judgment for the defen-
dant, the court observed that there is no absolute duty, in the exercise of
reasonable care, to warn all in the playing area before making a shot.3
Instead, "one about to strike a golf ball must exercise ordinary care to
warn those within the range of intended flight of the ball or general di-
rection of the drive, and the existence of such a duty to warn must be
determined from the facts of each case."24 Thus, the duty to exercise
reasonable care existed but was found not to have been breached in this
case.2
When the person harmed by the errant shot is not located on the golf
course, similar considerations apply. Again, it should be noted that the
jurisdictions refusing to apply negligence principles as between partici-
pants in the sport would find no such impediment when harm is inflicted
upon one who is off of the course. Nevertheless, in Rinaldo v. McGov-
19. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 34, at 213 (W. Page Keeton et al.
eds., 5th ed. 1984).
20. CADDYSHACK (Warner Bros. 1980)
21. Thompson, 559 N.E.2d at 708.
22. 820 S.W.2d 647 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
23. Id. at 651.
24. Id. at 650 (quoting Hoffman v. Polsky, 386 S.W.2d 376, 378 (Mo. 1965)).
25. Id.
2001)
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em,26 the plaintiff sustained injuries when the windshield of the car in
which she was riding was shattered by a golf ball. The ball was driven by
one of the two individual defendants. Apparently there was some doubt
as to which of the two hit the shot. It flew off the course on which they
were playing, cleared a group of trees and entered a road that was adja-
cent to the course. The plaintiff's vehicle was traveling on that road.
Affirming the summary judgment granted to the golfers by the trial
court, the New York Court of Appeals determined that the golfers could
not be held liable in negligence on the theory of failure to warn or be-
cause of a general lack of due care.27 As to the lack of warning, the
court stated:
In general, a golfer preparing to drive a ball has no duty to warn
persons "not in the intended line of flight on another tee or fair-
way." Even more to the point, whatever the extent of a golfer's
duty to other players in the immediate vicinity on the golf course,
a golfer ordinarily may not be held liable to individuals located
entirely outside of the boundaries of the golf course who happen
to be hit by a stray, mishit ball.28
The court found it highly questionable that a person riding in an auto
would have heard the usual "fore" warning, even if it had been given.29
The duty to warn certainly may relate to the skill, or lack thereof,
possessed by an individual golfer and his or her awareness of the risks
thereby posed. The case of Cook v. Johnston,3 ° for example, involved a
defendant who had a tendency to "shank" certain shots.31 He agreed to
play a round with three others and one of them, the plaintiff, was una-
ware of the defendant's tendency in that regard. The game proceeded
without incident to the ninth hole. There the defendant had advanced
his ball to a spot in the fairway approximately seventy to eighty yards
from the green. Before hitting his next shot, he noticed that the plaintiff
was seated in a golf cart approximately thirty yards away from the direct
and intended line of flight of that shot. When the defendant hit the ball,
he realized immediately that he had shanked the shot and yelled "fore."
26. 587 N.E.2d 264 (N.Y. 1991).
27. Id. at 266-67.
28. Id. at 266 (citations omitted).
29. Id.
30. 688 P.2d 215 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
31. Id. at 216. The court said that this
usually involves hitting the ball with an eight or nine iron or pitching wedge directly to
the right. The shank is the result of hitting the ball while the face of the club is open,
sending the ball in a straight line far to the right of the intended line of flight.
[Vol. 12:347
GOLF AND TORTS
The plaintiff turned his head toward the defendant and the ball struck
him in the right eye before he could move out of the way. In the trial
that followed, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent in
failing to previously warn him of the tendency to shank the ball on the
type of shot in question.32 The court observed that there was a general
rule that a golfer has a duty to warn others that he intends to hit the ball
when they are in the "zone of danger" and are unaware of his inten-
tion.33 It upheld the jury's finding of liability because the evidence of the
defendant's problem with errant shots created a question of fact as to
whether the plaintiff was within the zone of danger necessitating such a
warning.
34
There are also a number of cases dealing with golfers who inadver-
tently strike others with the golf club itself. Many involve situations in
which the golfer causes the contact while taking a practice swing on or
near teeing ground or at some practice area such as a driving range.
None of the cases are remarkable in that negligence principles are rou-
tinely employed. Since they have been collected elsewhere, nothing
more need be said.35
As to the duty owed by golfers to others in relation to the risks of the
game, one wonders whether there is in fact much of a difference be-
tween jurisdictions that apply negligence principles and those that im-
pose liability only for recklessness or intentional torts. Failure to warn
those in the "zone of danger" of an impending shot or errant shot may
be found negligent in the former and reckless in the latter. The cases
point to the fact that in identical situations the results would be the same
under either approach.
III. THE COURSE OWNER OR OPERATOR
When considering the potential liability of golf course owners and
operators, one should start with an analysis of whether the rules gener-
ally applicable to owners and occupiers of land apply in like fashion to
the golf course setting. 6 The first step in such a process is to determine
whether the potential plaintiff was located on or off of the course when
the harm occurred. If the plaintiff was on the course, the next step is to
32. Id.
33. Id. See also Hollinbeck v. Downey, 113 N.W.2d 9 (Minn. 1962).
34. Cook; 688 P.2d at 217.
35. Boyd J. Peterson, Annotation, Liability to One Struck By Golf Club, 63 A.L.R.4th 221
(1988).
36. See generally PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 19, § 57, at
387.
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determine whether he or she was a trespasser, licensee, or invitee. That
may be important because, at common law, different duties were owed
to each class.37 Of course, some jurisdictions have merged two or more
of the entrant categories when determining the liability of owners and
occupiers.38
Beginning first with plaintiffs located off of the golf course at the
time of harm, as a general proposition, owners and occupiers of land owe
those outside the premises a duty of reasonable care to protect them
from operations taking place on the premises.39 The case of Nussbaum
v. Lacopo4  is instructive in that regard. In Nussbaum, the plaintiff's
home was located on land abutting the thirteenth hole of the defendant
Plandome Country Club. Between the plaintiff's patio and the thir-
teenth fairway there was approximately twenty to thirty feet of rough
that contained a barrier of trees measuring forty-five to sixty feet high.
The plaintiff's real property line ran parallel to the thirteenth fairway.
However, the direct and proper line of flight from the tee to the green
on that hole was at a substantial angle to the right of the property line
and the rough. At a time when the rough was dense and the trees were
in full foliage, a trespasser entered the course and struck a ball from the
thirteenth tee. The shot, described by the court as "a high, bad one,"41
hooked over the rough and trees and struck the plaintiff who was stand-
ing on the patio of his property. The plaintiff alleged that the course was
negligent as to the design of the hole in question. The court concluded
that no liability could be imposed within the concepts of negligence,
stating:
That golf balls were found in the bushes and the fence area on
plaintiff's property does not tend to establish any risk. These in-
vasions are the annoyances which must be accepted by one who
seeks to reside in the serenity and semi-isolation of such a pas-
toral setting. Thus, even if notice of these intrusions may be
gleaned from the record, no preventive response was required.
Remedial steps would be called for only if defendant had notice
of a danger. Golf balls found in the areas adjacent to the rough -
where, according to plaintiff's evidence, they were discovered -
would not have come over the trees. It was that potential occur-
37. Id. §§ 57-61, at 386-432.
38. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (en banc); Antoniewicz v.
Reszcynski, 236 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1975).
39. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 19, § 57, at 387 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §371).
40. 265 N.E.2d 762 (N.Y. 1970).
41. Id. at 764.
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rence which might constitute a danger, and no notice of such an
incident was given. In fact, plaintiff's wife testified that no golf
ball ever struck her house. Certainly, if [the trespasser's] shot
were not extraordinary and golf balls had traveled over the trees,
plaintiff's house would have been hit.42
The court decided that under the "circumstances the possibility of an
accident could not be clear 'to the ordinarily prudent eye.' "4s The court
in Nussbaum contrasted the factual situation it faced with that in
Gleason v. Hillcrest Golf Course, Inc.44 In Gleason, an auto passenger
was injured when the windshield of the car in which she was riding was
struck by a golf ball. The turnpike on which the car was operated ran
parallel to the hole on the course from which the errant shot exited. At
that point the course was lined with a wire fence only six feet high and
about twenty-five feet from the road.45 The court in Gleason stated:
[I]f the owner of land contiguous to the highway is liable to a
traveler who falls into an excavation on the land, upon the ground
that the owner has not provided a means whereby harm might be
reasonably averted to one having no cause to expect danger, then,
by analogous reasoning, the converse situation must also deter-
mine liability - that the owner of such premises who creates a
condition upon his land, or who maintains such a condition in a
manner imputing presumptive knowledge thereof, whereby an
object from the land injures a lawful traveler upon the roadway, is
in duty bound to take appropriate means to ward off the danger.4 6
Cases involving harm to persons or property off of the golf course
should turn on a number of factors. Evidence as to the frequency with
which balls leave the course, the proximity of people and property to the
course boundaries, and the steps that the course owners and operators
took to prevent balls from leaving the course would seem crucial. These
cases will rise or fall on the perception by the trier of fact as to whether
the preventative steps taken were reasonable in light of the risks. Cer-
tainly, reasonable golf course operators would reassess these situations
as conditions around the course change. Many older courses were once
truly "country clubs." The same sites are now in urban settings next to
busy roadways, with nothing to account for that fact other than the pas-
sage of time.
42. Id. at 765-66.
43. Id. at 766.
44. 265 N.Y.S. 886 (Mun. Ct. 1933).
45. Id. at 887.
46. Id. at 896.
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The owners or operators of a golf course may also find the law of
nuisance applicable to the operation of such a facility and its effect upon
neighbors. In Sierra Screw Products v. Azusa Greens, Inc.,4 7 for exam-
ple, the owners of land adjacent to a golf course brought an action
against the owners of the course to require abatement of what was
claimed to be a nuisance resulting from golf balls coming onto the plain-
tiff's property. Numerous "golf balls [were found to] have entered plain-
tiff's property from the adjacent third and fourth fairways [of the
course,] causing damage to the automobiles of the plaintiff's employees,
and on [some] occasion[s]" striking and injuring employees.48 Employ-
ees were instructed to wear hard hats while working in the area.49 On
appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's finding of a private nuisance
and its entry of a mandatory injunction requiring the owners of the
course to redesign the two holes so as to reduce the risk of balls coming
onto the plaintiff's property.5" Of course, many persons purposefully
build or purchase homes adjacent to golf courses. For them, finding a
few golf balls in their back yards may not be unusual and the doctrine of
coming to a nuisance may be applicable.51
When considering the liability of the course owner or occupier to
golfers and spectators who are actually on the course, general negligence
principles should apply. A good example is the case of Cornell v. Lang-
land.5 2 It involved a situation in which the plaintiff was on the green of
one of the holes at a golf course and was struck by a ball hit by a player
who teed off on the same hole. The scorecard showed that the hole was
315 yards in length from tee to green, when in fact the distance was 232
yards from the center of the tee to the center of the green. The golfer
whose shot hit the plaintiff said that he decided to hit the ball because of
the scorecard yardage and, at the time of the accident, could not under-
stand how he could hit a ball as far as 315 yards. The course manager
stated that the yardage was not 315 yards because the green had been
moved closer to the tee which occurred after the scorecards had been
printed. It appeared that the operators of the course did not want to go
to the expense of destroying the supply of old cards and printing new
ones.53 The court reasoned that the evidence was sufficient to support a
47. 151 Cal. Rptr. 799 (Ct. App. 1979).
48. Id. at 801.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 806.
51. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 19, § 88B, at 634-36.
52. 440 N.E.2d 985 (II1. App. Ct. 1982).
53. Id. at 987.
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negligence claim against the course for failing to advise golfers of the
correct yardage.54 However, even if the course knew the yardage was
incorrect, the failure to change the card did not constitute "the type of
intentional, deliberate and outrageous conduct which would support the
imposition of punitive damages."55 Though the court made no final de-
termination regarding the negligence of the golfer, as the golfer was vol-
untarily dismissed from the case at the close of the plaintiff's case, the
court did find the golfer was misinformed as to the actual yardage, and,
based on this misinformation, he reasonably believed that the plaintiff
was out of his range when he hit the shot.56
The case of Quesenberry v. Milwaukee County57 presents an interest-
ing situation involving a state statute that exempted landowners from the
obligation to keep premises safe for those who participate in recreational
activities. The plaintiff suffered a broken leg and other injuries when she
stepped into an eighteen-inch diameter hole on the fairway of a course
owned by the county. The hole was created by a drainage tile, was cov-
ered with grass and was not readily visible, having no warning signs or
barriers.58 The statute exempted landowners from the "duty to keep the
premises safe for entry or use by others for hunting, fishing, trapping,
camping, hiking, snowmobiling, berry picking, water sports, sight-seeing,
cutting or removing wood, climbing of observation towers or recreational
purposes."59 The county claimed that it should not be liable as a result
of the statute because golf was a "recreational purpose" for which the
plaintiff entered the land.6 1 The court looked at the legislative history of
the statute and found that it was initially enacted to encourage landown-
ers in the state to open their property to hunters.61 Although the statute
was subsequently amended to include the other enumerated recreational
activities, the court construed the term "recreational purpose" as not to
include sports such as golf:
[T]he general term "recreational purposes" should be limited to
activities similar to the preceding enumerated words. We con-
clude that the common feature of the enumerated words is that
they are the type of activity that one associates being done on
land in its natural undeveloped state as contrasted to the more
54. Id. at 988.
55. Id.
56. Cornell, 440 N.E.2d at 989.
57. 317 N.W.2d 468 (Wis. 1982).
58. Id. at 470.
59. Id. at 469 n.1 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 29.68 (1977)) (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 471.
61. Id. at 471-72.
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structured, landscaped and improved nature of a golf course with
its fairways, sand traps, rough and greens created for one pur-
pose: to play the game of golf. However, the enumerated activi-
ties may sometimes occur on land that has been developed, such
as bird hunting in a corn field or berry picking in a planted berry
patch instead of in the woods. But golfing is clearly not the type
of activity that is done on land in its natural undeveloped state.62
It is obvious that the writer of the opinion was either a very good golfer
or had never in his life played the game. Many golfers spend most of
their time on the natural, undeveloped part of golf courses and venture
infrequently onto the "structured, landscaped and improved" portions.
Nevertheless, the court found the statute inapplicable to golf and re-
versed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint.63 Subse-
quently, the Wisconsin Legislature repealed the statute under
consideration in Quesenberry and enacted a new statute that contains a
more expansive list of specific recreational activities, including the
phrase "any other outdoor sport., 64 The act that created the new statute
carried a statement of legislative intent that, in part, states that it is "in-
tended to overrule any previous Wisconsin supreme court decisions in-
terpreting [the old statute] if the decision is more restrictive than or
inconsistent with the provisions of this act."' 65 If Quesenberry was de-
cided under the new statute, the result would no doubt have been
different.
Even in California, where as between players no duty is owed other
than to avoid recklessness or intentional torts,6 6 a different situation per-
tains as between the course operator and the golfer. In Morgan v. Fuji
Country USA, Inc.,67 the plaintiff was struck by a ball after he had teed
off on the fifth hole. The ball came from the fourth hole, the green that
adjoined the fifth tee. The course owner, Fuji, had removed a large pine
tree that offered some protection to those on the fifth tee. 6' The Califor-
nia court explained the difference between duties of golfers and course
operators in the following fashion:
As between golfers, the duty is to play within the bounds of the
game; to not intentionally injure another player or to engage in
conduct "that is so reckless as to be totally outside the range of
62. Quesenberry, 317 N.W.2d. at 472.
63. Id. at 473-74.
64. Wis. STAT. § 895.52(1)(g) (2000).
65. 1983 Wis. Laws 418 § 1.
66. Dilger, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 594.
67. 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 249 (Ct. App. 1995).
68. Id. at 250.
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the ordinary activity involved in" golf. The duty of a golf course
towards a golfer is to provide a reasonably safe golf course. This
duty requires the golf course owner "to minimize the risks with-
out altering the nature of the sport." Thus, the owner of a golf
course has an obligation to design a golf course to minimize the
risk that players will be hit by golf balls, e.g., by the way the vari-
ous tees, fairways and greens are aligned or separated. In certain
areas of a golf course, because of the alignment or separation of
the tee, fairway and/or greens, the golf course owner may also
have a duty to provide protection for players from being hit with
golf balls "where the greatest danger exists and where such an
occurrence is reasonably to be expected" just as a baseball sta-
dium owner may have a duty to provide protection for spectators
from thrown bats or errant balls in that part of the stadium where
the danger of being hit is particularly high and dangerous.6 9
The court concluded that Fuji owed a duty of care to the player. Evi-
dence presented by the plaintiff that the area of the fifth tee was a partic-
ularly dangerous place due to the design of the fourth and fifth tees and
the removal of the trees supported a finding that Fuji breached the duty
of care that was owed. Fuji argued that because the risk of being hit by a
golf ball was obvious, it owed no duty to the plaintiff. The court ob-
served that the obviousness of a risk might, however, support a duty to
provide protection.7 °
Persons present on a golf course for reasons other than to play, such
as spectators at a tournament, present another interesting situation in-
volving the liability of course owners and operators. Some of these visi-
tors may know little or nothing about the sport and its inherent risks. In
Duffy v. Midlothian Country Club,7 1 the plaintiff was attending a profes-
sional golf tournament and was hit in the eye by a golf ball as she was
standing in a concession area. The concession area was located between
the first and eighteenth fairways of the course. She brought a negligence
action against both the course and the sponsoring association, asserting
failure to use reasonable care to warn the plaintiff of the danger of the
approaching ball and also to restrict the plaintiff from entering an alleg-
edly dangerous area. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment based on assertions that the plaintiff was aware of
the inherent risks involved in such a tournament, evidence of which
69. Id. at 253 (quoting Knight v. Jewett, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2 (Ct. App. 1992) (citations
omitted)).
70. Id. at 253.
71. 415 N.E.2d 1099 (IIl. App. Ct. 1980).
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came primarily from her deposition.72 On appeal, the court determined
that the defendants would have had a duty of reasonable care toward
spectators if they were business visitors. The standard of care and the
plaintiff's appreciation of the danger were for the jury to determine.73
In Grisim v. TapeMark Charity Pro-Am Golf Tournament,'4 the
plaintiff was likewise a spectator at a tournament. She was seated on the
grass some thirty to fifty feet to the left of the eighteenth green when she
was struck by the shot of an approaching player. There were no ropes,
barricades or signs indicating spectator areas, nor were there marshals,
ushers or officials to guide spectators. The trial court granted the defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment.75 It found that because the plain-
tiff made the choice of where to sit, "primary assumption of risk applied
and 'she assumed the risk to protect herself from known dangers or such
dangers incident to the game as would be apparent to a reasonable per-
son in the exercise of due care.' ,76 The appellate court reversed finding
that, in Minnesota, so-called "primary assumption of risk" turned on the
question of whether, at inherently dangerous sporting events, spectators
have a choice between protected and dangerous areas from which to ob-
serve the sport. It determined that in this case a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact existed as to whether adequate protection was provided at the
tournament. The court, on a motion for summary judgment, could not
resolve that issue. It concluded that if the defendants had provided ade-
quate protection and the plaintiff chose not to take advantage of that
seating, then primary assumption of risk would apply.77
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the liability of owners and op-
erators of golf courses to those who are either on or off of the course will
be resolved by the rules of the jurisdiction that are usually applied in
actions against owners and occupiers of land. General negligence princi-
ples will be followed and, as to plaintiffs who were on the property at the
time of injury, status such as trespasser, licensee, or invitee may be
important.
72. Id. at 1101-03.
73. Id. at 1105.
74. 394 N.W.2d 261 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), rev'd in part, en banc, 415 N.W.2d 874 (Minn.
1987).
75. Id. at 262.
76. Id. at 263.
77. Id. at 264.
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IV. THE GOLF EQUIPMENT SELLER
Golfers employ a variety of products in order to play the game. In
addition to clothing, these include such items as bans, clubs, bags, and
cleated shoes. However, with one exception, the only reported cases
that have been found relating to golf products and Tort theories involve
the motorized vehicles, known as "golf carts," used to transport golfers
and their playing equipment around a course.78
It is surprising that few cases were found that involved personal inju-
ries caused by defective golf clubs. Some may be unaware of the fact
that the heads of most golf clubs are secured to their shafts with nothing
more than epoxy glue.79 If not properly installed, the head can separate
from the shaft during the swing. This was the author's experience in one
instance and the cause was found to be improper insertion of a graphite
shaft."' If, as previously noted, the speed of the golf swing approaches
one hundred miles per hour, simple physics dictates that the club head
will leave the shaft with that initial velocity - until it comes in contact
with something or someone. It is obvious that substantial harm could
result in such a case.
From the few cases that have been found, it appears certain that basic
product liability rules will be applied to golf equipment sellers. To the
extent that the "pro" at a country club sells equipment to club members
and others, he or she may be in for a rude awakening. No doubt the pro
would be considered a "seller" for the purposes of strict liability in tort,,"
or a "merchant" for the purposes of an implied warranty of
merchantability under the Uniform Commercial Code. 2
The cases make it abundantly clear that the sellers of golf products
will be treated no differently than other sellers when bodily injury or
property damage results from defective equipment. It should be noted,
of course, that the doctrine of strict liability in tort has been extended to
product lessors as well as to actual sellers such as manufacturers and
78. See, e.g., Donnelly v. Club Car, Inc., 724 So. 2d 25 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998); Shaffner v.
City of Riverview, 397 N.W.2d 835 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Meister v. Fisher, 462 So. 2d 1071
(Fla. 1984); Sipari v. Villa Olivia Country Club, 380 N.E.2d 819 (I1. App. Ct. 1978); Blevins v.
Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1977) (en banc).
79. RALPH MALTBY, GOLF CLUB DESIGN, FrrrNG, ALTERATION & REPAIR 37,90 (1974).
80. Interview with Carl Christensen, 1998 Northern Clubmaker of the Year, Golf
Clubmakers Ass'n, in Waukesha, Wis. (Aug. 7, 2001).
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (1965).
82. U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1977).
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retailers.83 This is important due to the fact that most golf courses rent
golf clubs and golf carts. In Sipari v. Villa Olivia Country Club,8' for
example the plaintiff was seriously injured when the cart in which he was
riding overturned and then fell on top of him. In his action against the
cart manufacturer and the course that leased the cart to him, the court
determined that the action could proceed against the lessor even though
there was an exculpation clause in the rental ticket that the plaintiff
signed. The court stated that "[t]he strict liability imposed [by previous
authority] applies not only to manufacturers but also to distributors and
retailers, and lessors .... To hold otherwise would be to contravene the
essence of strict tort liability."8 6
The one case found that dealt with golf equipment other than a riding
cart is Hauter v. Zogarts. 7 It was concerned with a golf practice device
known as the "Golfing Gizmo." The product was described by the court
as:
a simple device consisting of two metal pegs, two cords - one elas-
tic, one cotton - and a regulation golf ball. After the pegs are
driven into the ground approximately 25 inches apart, the elastic
cord is looped over them. The cotton cord, measuring 21 feet in
length, ties to the middle of the elastic cord. The ball is attached
to the end of the cotton cord. When the cords are extended, the
Gizmo resembles the shape of a large letter "T," with the ball
resting at the base. 8
The user stands at the ball to hit shots. The elastic cord is intended to
stop the ball from traveling the distance it would ordinarily travel with-
out being so restricted. 9 The label on the shipping carton and the in-
structions urge the player to use full power with shots and also stated
"COMPLETELY SAFE BALL WILL NOT HIT PLAYER." 90 With his
first use of the product the plaintiff hit a shot and the ball came back and
83. See, e.g., Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581 (Del. 1976); Price v. Shell
Oil Co., 466 P.2d 722 (Cal. 1970) (en banc); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Servs.,
212 A.2d 769 (N.J. 1965).
84. 380 N.E.2d 819 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
85. Id. at 823.
86. See also Donnelly, 724 So. 2d 25; Shaffner, 397 N.W.2d 835; Meister, 462 So. 2d 1071;
Cavers v. Cushman Motor Sales, Inc., 157 Cal. Rptr. 142 (Ct. App. 1979); Blevins, 551 S.W.2d
602.
87. 534 P.2d 377 (Cal. 1975) (en banc).
88. Id. at 379.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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hit him in the head. This caused severe injury.91 On appeal the Califor-
nia Supreme Court concluded:
[The plaintiff's] testimony shows that he read and relied upon de-
fendants' representation; he was impressed by "something on the
cover dealing with the safety of the item." More importantly, de-
fendants presented no evidence which could remove their assur-
ance of safety from the basis of the bargain. The trial court
properly concluded, therefore, that defendants expressly war-
ranted the safety of their product and are liable for [the plain-
tiffs] injuries which resulted from a breach of that warranty.92
Thus, as noted previously, sellers of golf products will be treated no
differently than sellers of other products in cases involving those who are
injured by those products. One would not expect otherwise.
V. CONCLUSION
Except for those situations previously noted that involve golfers who
are defendants, Tort principles appear to be applied in golf-related cases
no differently than they are with respect to any other activity. The case
could be made that even with golfer-defendants the application of princi-
ples of reasonable care would produce no different results than would be
the case in jurisdictions that preclude liability except for recklessness or
intentional torts.
While the affirmative defenses available to defendants in golf cases
have not been discussed in any detail, suffice it to say that the standard
affirmative defenses such as contributory negligence, implied assumption
of risk, and the like, where applicable under current law, should also
apply in golf cases. With the adoption of comparative negligence, a
number of jurisdictions have eliminated the doctrine of implied assump-
tion of risk.93 Of course, a Tort purist would argue that implied assump-
tion of risk has nothing to do with the issue of reasonable care other than
to relieve the defendant of any duty to the plaintiff - in effect, similar to
the privilege of consent as to intentional torts. Nevertheless, the defense
should be alert to the fact that implied assumption of risk may not be a
viable defense in a golf case, with only the reasonableness of the plain-
tiff's conduct in light of the perceived risk an issue.
91. Id.
92. Hauter, 534 P.2d at 384-85.
93. PROSSER AND KEErON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 19, § 68, at 495-96.
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